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Abstract 
In many parts of the world people live in “dual polities”: they are governed by the state and 
organize collective decision-making within their ethnic community according to traditional 
rules. We examine the substantial body of works on the traditional–state dualism, focusing on 
the internal organization of traditional polities, their interaction with the state, and the 
political consequences of the dualism. We find the descriptions of the internal organization of 
traditional polities scattered and lacking comparative perspective. The literature on the 
interaction provides a good starting point for theorizing the strategic role of traditional leaders 
as intermediaries, but large potentials for inference remain underexploited. Studies on the 
consequences of “dual polities" for democracy, conflict and development are promising in 
their explanatory endeavor but they do not yet allow for robust conclusions. We therefore 
propose an institutionalist research agenda addressing the need for theory and for systematic 
data collection and explanatory approaches. 
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Introduction 
In many states ethnic groups organize collective decision-making, service provision and 
jurisdiction according to traditional rules of governance. Traditional governance entails, for 
example, the selection of chiefs and elders, or procedures for decision-making, dispute 
settlement, land allocation, or inheritance. Contemporary traditional forms of governance co-
exist with the political institutions and laws of states. Traditional governance is a global 
phenomenon. Of the 193 member states of the United Nations, 103 recognize the existence of 
particular ethnic groups in their constitution. Seventy of them grant special cultural or 
political rights to these communities. Sixty-one countries (as diverse as Ghana, India, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Paraguay and Tuvalu) explicitly recognize forms of traditional 
governance and customary law (authors’ data collection). Only in Europe traditional 
governance seems to be mostly absent. 
The JuriGlobe research group (2016) estimates that 57 percent of the world’s population 
lives in states where customary law and other forms of law coincide. For the African 
continent, some scholars have identified a veritable “resurgence” of traditional governance 
from the 1990s onwards (Englebert 2002a; Herbst 2000; Muriaas 2011; Ubink 2008). While 
in some states ethnic groups applying traditional governance constitute minorities (in North 
America, or Australia), elsewhere, large shares of the population live under dual governance 
(in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America or South-Asia). The co-existence of traditional 
governance institutions ranges from federal arrangements with sizeable autonomy of the 
traditional polity (in North America) to indigenous rights (in South America) and legislative 
Houses of Chiefs (in Ghana or Namibia).  
Since the traditional-state dualism is especially widespread in regions ridden by internal 
conflict, delayed democratization, and stalled development (Sub-Saharan Africa, some areas 
of South Asia), investigating these dynamics systematically seems imperative. Yet, despite 
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the considerable size of the phenomenon of “dual governance”, its functions and its 
consequences are not yet sufficiently understood. How significant is traditional governance 
today and how does it vary across countries? Under which conditions do traditional 
institutions survive, or even resurge? Which forms of parallelism of state and traditional 
governance exist, and how are they regulated? Do state and traditional authorities cooperate, 
compete, or complement each other? Does traditional governance foster or undermine 
democracy? Does dual governance intensify or reduce domestic conflict? Are traditional 
institutions conducive to economic development, or are their economic traditions at odds with 
the principles of contemporary market economies? 
To some degree, these questions have been tackled in a substantial, methodologically 
diverse, and cross-regional literature. Recent works (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2014; Baldwin 
2013, 2014, 2015; Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2014; Koter 2013; Logan 2013; Murtazashvili and 
Murtazashvili 2015) demonstrate that the topic continues to puzzle political scientists, 
because traditional governance today complements, substitutes, and challenges state authority 
in various contexts – be it with regard to public goods provision, conflict resolution, elections, 
land tenure, human rights, or the role of women in society. Political scientists seek to 
comprehend the institutional setup as well as the political and socio-economic effects of such 
dualist systems. Yet, beyond country-level studies, rigorous comparative regional or global 
perspectives on the interaction of traditional forms of governance and state institutions are 
still rare. Therefore, a stocktaking of this research area permits highlighting comparative 
research potentials, in order to launch a broader debate on the phenomenon of traditional 
governance and its worldwide consequences.  
More generally, research on dual governance may also contribute to the understanding of 
other parallel governance setups, i.e. where the church and the state coexist as regulatory 
entities within states (Griffiths 1986; Sandberg 2015), where the EU and state governments 
vie for authority harmonization in the same territory, or where a variety of IGOs and INGOs 
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provide international hard and soft law that may compete with national rules and with each 
other (Berman 2012).  The EU actively developed legal strategies to integrate the parallel 
systems, via the Copenhagen criteria as prerequisite for membership, the doctrines of 
supremacy and direct effect, and various harmonization techniques reaching from minimum 
to total harmonization (Craig and de Búrca 2011). Overall, parallelism of political systems, 
legal rules, and public service provision is a phenomenon of wide-ranging relevance. 
Our contribution in this article is twofold: First, we provide a structured, systematic 
overview of the existing knowledge, and outline fruitful angles of research that can inform a 
comparative analysis of traditional governance and its interaction with the state. Second, 
based on our mapping of existing work, we specify research potentials and sketch exemplary 
hypotheses to tackle lacunae in the literature as a reference for future comparative research.   
We proceed as follows: first, we provide the conceptual background to study the dualism 
of traditional governance and the state and present the analytical framework we employ to 
capture the phenomenon. In the second section we apply this framework to map the existing 
knowledge on dual governance, and discuss the academic literature speaking to our topic. 
This literature mirrors the varying significance of traditional governance across the 
continents. Much of the research has focused on sub-Saharan Africa, and thus the majority of 
the discussed studies concentrate on the continent. In the final section, we formulate future 
alleys for comparative research built on what has been contributed so far in terms of theory, 
data, and systematic empirical evidence.  
Conceptual Background and Analytical Framework 
Delineation of Traditional Governance and Dualism 
By traditional we refer to a form of governance understood and validated through narratives 
or procedures deemed “traditional” by constituents. It is usually not codified, has been applied 
for quite some time, and refers to the past of an ethnic community (cf. Zartman 2000: 7). The 
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term traditional is not equivalent to ancient or primordial. We are agnostic as to how old the 
“tradition” is, and whether it was invented” or not (Ranger 1983). The term mainly refers to a 
mode of legitimization of political institutions. 
We choose the term governance implying the political function of steering a community 
(the “ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services” in the words of Fukuyama 
2013, 350). Governance refers to organizations and to rules aiming at regulating behavior and 
taking decisions for a collective. The concept of traditional authorities, by contrast, denotes 
persons and organizations, whereas traditional political institutions encompass organizations 
and procedural rules, but not the substantial rules or services the political system generates.  
The term traditional governance thus captures a variety of traditional authorities such as 
chiefs, kings, headmen, queen mothers, councils of elders, etc. It also captures traditional 
procedural rules such as mechanisms for conflict resolution or leadership selection. Finally, it 
includes the substantial rules with respect to internal security, land and resource allocation, 
public health, or matters of marriage and inheritance. 
Polity dualism (Buur and Kyed 2007) describes the coexistence of two distinct political 
and legal systems in the same territory and applying to the same people: the state and 
traditional governance. Scholars have introduced various terms to designate this particular 
institutional setup: "mixed government" (Sklar 2005), "twilight institutions" (Lund 2007) or 
"hybrid political orders" (Boege, Brown and Clements 2009), but dualism is the most precise 
notion to describe the co-existence of two polities.  
The Dual Institutional Setup and its Consequences 
Below, we systematize the knowledge on the political institutions that traditional systems of 
governance entail today. This task requires accounting for the variance of such institutions 
across ethnic groups, countries, and regions. We therefore distinguish two broad domains of 
research: (1) the institutional setups involving traditional governance, i.e. the internal 
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organization of traditional communities, and the forms of co-existence of traditional 
governance and the state; and (2) the political consequences of the dualism for democracy, 
peace and conflict, and development. Based on these domains, we identify, discuss, and 
structure the existing knowledge on dual governance in the following section.  
These domains also roughly mirror the chronological order of research on traditional 
governance since the 1950s. We present them as a “best fit” to capture the literature most 
relevant to political science. We acknowledge, however, that further areas have been 
investigated in the past. In particular, there is a large body of research on customary land 
rights that is covered excellently elsewhere (Boone 2014 for Africa, Stocks 2005 for Latin 
America). Similarly, we do not include the literature on the use of traditional approaches for 
transitional justice processes (e.g. Corey and Joireman 2004). Finally, since our interest is the 
contemporary dual setup, and as we cannot do justice to the diverse history of traditional 
polities within the scope of our discussion here, we point the reader to the excellent 
ethnographic and historical perspectives on the topic in Murdock (1967), Ross (1983), Ayittey 
(1993), Davidson (1992), Osabu-Kle (2000).1 Structuring existing works along our analytical 
framework allows us to pinpoint the most fruitful angles of research and potentials for future 
analysis. 
Mapping the Dualism of Traditional Governance and the State 
Institutional Setup: Internal Organization of Traditional Communities 
Anthropologists have mostly focused on the internal organization of traditional polities, their 
social structure (such as lineage and heritage), and historical developments of African tribes 
(e.g. Hammond-Tooke 1985). Frequently, traditional polities are categorized along a 
centralization-decentralization scale. Some studies focus on specific groups while others 
compare tribes or language groups within one country. Further studies advance historical 
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descriptions, and examine cultural adaptation, the role of women, or specific rituals of 
selected groups (e.g. Evans-Pritchard 1958).  
Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1958) provide a comparative description of social 
organization in eight African societies. They discern two groups: those with “centralized 
authority, administrative machinery, and judicial institutions – in short, a government”, and a 
those with a lack thereof (1958, 5). Eisenstadt (1959) similarly distinguishes African political 
systems with central authority and those without. A more recent useful typology of political 
organization among sub-Saharan ethnic groups developed by the Economic Commission on 
Africa (ECA 2007b) distinguishes according to centralization and the accountability of rulers 
between consensus-based systems and chieftaincy systems.  
Studies in legal anthropology examine the mechanisms of authority and sanction, and the 
practices of customary law in specific indigenous communities. Among them are Schapera’s 
studies of Tswana law (1938) and Gluckman’s work on customary law (1965). Although 
Gluckman (1965) and Nader and Todd (1978) offer comparisons of political and legal 
systems of some African tribes, most studies remain single ethnic-group oriented.  
These studies provide a fertile basis for the understanding of social and political 
hierarchies and legal attributes of indigenous societies. To map today’s political organization 
of traditional polities, scholars could start from these studies and assess contemporary 
institutions for the same groups. However, most typological distinctions so far lack analytical 
clarity. Categories for (de)centralization, the political and administrative functions, or the 
selection of rulers are neither sufficiently explained nor analytically separated. To understand 
the principles of internal organization across traditional polities, scholars need to move 
beyond one-dimensional scaling.  
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Institutional Setup: Co-existence and Interaction of Traditional Governance and State 
The coexistence of multiple legal structures in one state (i.e. legal pluralism) and the question 
how to incorporate customary law into modern state law have been studied since the 1960s 
(Allott 1984; Read 1963; e.g. Benjamin 2008;  Hinz 2010). Various typologies of state-
traditional legal integration have been proposed. For cases across the world, Forsyth (2007, 
69) develops a typology of relationships between non-state and state justice systems – with 
seven models distinguished by the degree to which the state agrees to non-state adjudication.  
Beyond legal integration, Ubink (2008) and Muriaas (2011) offer typologies of how 
traditional and state authorities organize their political coexistence. Ubink distinguishes seven 
state policies: exclusion, adaptation and re-orientation, integration, subordination, association, 
harmonization and laissez-faire (Ubink 2008, 21-23). While she only gives selective examples 
– integration in Cameroon, subordination in Namibia, and association in Ghana – her 
typology might serve as a basis for further categorization. Muriaas outlines four possible 
modes of incorporation according to two dimensions: the degree of autonomy of traditional 
authorities from the state, and the degree of decentralization pursued by the state. Both 
authors’ typologies help describing the co-existence between traditional governance and the 
state. Yet, both are state-centric and do not include the motivations of the traditional leaders, 
which would be necessary to capture the actual interaction and to explain why we see this 
great variance.  
Herbst (2000) understands traditional authorities as central political actors not only in pre-
colonial times but also in present-day Africa. He analyses the considerable diversity of 
contemporary land tenure regimes involving traditional governance. He concludes that “the 
equilibrium in conventional politics between state and traditional leaders – where neither 
makes significant inroads on the other’s turf – appears likely to be relatively stable for many 
countries for many years” (2000, 197). 
10 
Interactive dynamics on the local level are studied in a number of volumes. Vaughan’s 
collection of country case studies explores how traditional institutions “foster or hamper local 
initiatives in governance” (2005, 398) and individual chapters address questions of authority 
and legitimacy, legal pluralism, gender equality, and conflict resolution. Similarly, Ray and 
Reddy (2003) examine local governance interactions between traditional actors and the state 
in single countries of Africa and the Caribbean. Fokwang (2009) compares two chiefdoms in 
Cameroon and South Africa, and traces how chiefs become involved in party politics. 
Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal and van Dijk 1999 also use country studies to explore the 
interplay of chieftaincies and the neo-colonial state. The chapters treat traditional political 
institutions as modern political actors, and assess the determinants of their political positions, 
their symbolic functions, and the resources they can mobilize within African societies. 
Baldwin (2013) emphasizes the strategic element in the interactions. She studies chiefs as 
the central gatekeepers for local political decision-making in Zambia. Using a quantitative 
and experimental research design, she shows that stronger relationships between state 
representatives and traditional chiefs not only lead to better public service provision in the 
respective communities: voters are also more likely to vote for the candidate the chief 
communicates as his preference. Then again, Clayton et al. (2015) find for Sierra Leone that 
where traditional chiefs and councilors compete for authority over public goods provision, 
service provision is improved. Baldwin (2014) also identifies explanations as to why 
politicians would transfer control over land allocation to chiefs in Africa. She demonstrates 
that political leaders strategically devolve power to chiefs for mobilization purposes during 
elections. Political leaders are likely to strategically reach out (a) to chiefs of hierarchically 
organized groups, because of their greater mobilization potential; and (b) to chiefs of an 
ethnic group that is “not allied with the government or the major opposition party” (p. 257).  
Similarly, Koter (2013) studies the conditions under which local chiefs act as “electoral 
intermediaries” to mobilize voters. For Benin and Senegal, Koter shows that where strong 
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local leaders exist, cross-ethnic allegiances can emerge when political candidates, via these 
intermediaries, reach out to non-co-ethnic communities that are otherwise difficult to win 
over. If strong local leadership is absent, co-ethnic allegiances predominate. For Afghanistan, 
Murtazashvili (2014) demonstrates that village level customary authorities, albeit lacking a 
state mandate, interact with state representatives, and take over functions in dispute resolution 
and small-scale public good provision. Moreover, customary institutions are more effective in 
maintaining property rights in the country (Murtazashvili and Murtazaschvili 2015). 
Koelble and LiPuma (2011) show more generally that government and chiefs engage in a 
mutually advantageous relationship. In South Africa, chiefs have used the weakness of the 
state in rural hinterlands to “position themselves as intermediaries, even decision makers, 
between state and society” (p. 6). While chiefs had only minor influence following their 
collaborative role during apartheid, the authors describe traditional leaders’ resurgence as a 
consequence of the rise of democracy, the dysfunctional provincial administration, and the 
support of the African National Congress (ANC). Traditional leaders engage in reforms to 
receive constitutional recognition and leverage over land, and the government uses the chiefs 
to “help mediate the relationship between the urban-based liberal state and an impoverished 
isolated hinterland” (p. 13; cf. Oomen and van Kessel 1997). 
In sum, research on the co-existence of traditional governance and the state falls into two 
categories. Studies of legal pluralism deal with the parallelism of norm systems, their 
potential collision, and attempts at formal integration. Political scientists study the interaction 
of traditional and state actors, depicting both as strategic political actors, the chiefs acting as 
intermediaries and vote brokers. The insights gained from these studies serve as a fruitful 
basis for the development of theory and general hypotheses.   
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Consequences: Democracy  
Researchers have also studied the consequences of traditional governance for democracy. 
Two competing normative approaches in the literature have been referred to as the neo-
traditional and neo-liberal paradigms (Davidson 1992; ECA 2007a; Keulder 1998). Neo-
traditionalists view traditional leadership as compatible with democratic governance due to 
elements such as consensual decision-making and public participation (Adedeji 1994; Keulder 
1998; Nabudere 2004; Oomen 2005; Osabu-Kle 2000). By contrast, the neo-liberal approach 
argues that traditional institutions contradict the idea of liberal democracy because they 
disregard democratic procedural standards, gender equality and human rights (Mamdani 
1996; Ntsebeza 2005).  
Systematic empirical proof for these claims is still lacking. On the more skeptical side, 
Hariri (2012) shows for a large-N sample that where proto-state pre-colonial institutions 
existed, they actually inhibited the development of the democratic state, leading to more 
autocratic contemporary governance in these countries. Strong pre-colonial institutions meant 
a stronger autocratic legacy of traditional rule. Using surveys and a policy experiment for 
Lesotho, Clayton (2014) demonstrates how increased female representation can decrease the 
power of local traditional chiefs. Yashar (2005) offers a rare comparative perspective on the 
clash of neoliberal reforms and indigenous identity in her analysis of constituency 
mobilization in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. According to her argument, neoliberal 
institutional changes have politicized ethnic and indigenous identification, as reforms 
“challenged enclaves of local autonomy that had gone largely unrecognized by the state” 
(ibid. 8). 
Using the Afrobarometer, Logan (2009, 2013) demonstrates that the coexistence of 
traditional and modern forms of governance is a given reality in many African countries. The 
Afrobarometer Survey (Round 4, 2009) shows the significance of traditional governance in 
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contemporary Africa. In the 19 countries in which the survey asks for evaluations of 
traditional institutions and authorities, a share of 44.7 percent of respondents trust their 
traditional leaders “a lot” and 22.9 percent confide at least “somewhat” in their traditional 
leaders (question Q49I). On average, two thirds of the respondents hold that the influence of 
traditional leaders should “increase a lot” or at least “somewhat” (Q66). Logan finds that 
“positive attitudes toward chiefs are not incompatible with democracy” (p. 23). Her 2013 
analysis suggests that traditional leaders play an essential role in local governance not only 
due to their cultural role, but also because they resolve conflicts and are accessible to 
community members. She concludes, “rather than finding themselves trapped between two 
competing spheres of political authority, Africans appear to have adapted to the hybridization 
of their political institutions” (2009, 101f.). 
Baldwin’s book (2015) tackles the question of the role of traditional leaders for 
democratic processes comprehensively, by using a multi-method approach with cross- and 
subnational data, surveys, and experiments in Zambia. She finds that, despite the assumed 
non-democratic legitimacy of chiefs, their involvement often makes governments more 
responsive, since traditional leaders have potentials to mobilize local constituencies and to 
voice existing community problems to state authorities. She identifies the reasons for these 
positive potentials in the time horizon of chiefs, who can act as “development brokers” 
without fears of losing office and with a long-term interest in the wellbeing of the 
communities they live in. 
Baldwin and Mvukiyehe (2015) examine the hypothesis that elections facilitate collective 
action by exploiting a natural experiment that saw some customary chiefs in Liberia elected 
by their constituency and others appointed following the civil wars in the country. Using 
surveys and interactive games played with chiefs, they find that introducing elections into 
traditional polities does “not significantly improve most types of collective action and […] 
may harm public order and the provision of public goods” (p.. 691). By contrast, customary 
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methods of leadership selection are more prone to establish public order, pointing to the 
legitimacy of the political process maintained in the traditional polity.  
Buur and Kyed (2007) empirically trace the democratic functions of traditional 
institutions and their role within the democratization process in African countries. Their 
edited volume (2007) presents eight case studies applying different foci and coming to 
skeptical conclusions. Chiweza (2007) finds in her analysis of Malawi that the increased role 
of traditional leaders as official representatives of their local communities reduces 
constituents to dependent subjects rather than creating politically capable citizens. Hagmann 
(2007) shows for the Somali region of Ethiopia that the legal incorporation of traditional 
authorities actually decreases their accountability and reduces their popular legitimacy. 
Thus, empirical analyses provide evidence for negative and positive effects of traditional 
governance on democracy. However, the country studies are hardly comparable and do not 
allow for general conclusions. Although studies by Baldwin (2015), Hariri (2012), and Logan 
(2009, 2013) hint at a correlation between the extent of traditional governance in a country 
and its degree of democracy, we do not yet know whether traditional governance may 
strengthen or weaken democracy. 
Consequences: Peace and Conflict 
Traditional governance institutions might contribute to internal ethnic conflict, because a 
deep-seated organization on the level of ethnic groups may intensify feelings of identity and 
facilitate ethnic mobilization and hostility toward other groups. On the contrary, the inclusion 
of traditional authorities in domestic politics might maintain security, because dispute 
resolution is a classic function of traditional governance.  
Again, existing scholarship comes to varying conclusions. For example, Walls and 
Kibble (2010, 39) claim that the incorporation of traditional governance in Somaliland has 
provided the conditions for “sustained peace and stability.” In contrast, Lund (2003) points to 
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the possibility of violent clashes caused by competition among traditional authorities and 
confusion surrounding their integration into local administration in Northern Ghana.  
Ember et al. (1992) make use of the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample by Murdock and 
White (1969) and find support for the hypothesis that democracies (here: more participatory 
polities) do rarely fight each other. Tore Wig (2014) argues that strong traditional political 
institutions facilitate non-violent bargaining between excluded ethnic groups and the state. He 
tests his argument with a large-N analysis of African civil wars between 1950 and 2010. Wig 
finds groups excluded from political power but with strong traditional institutions are less 
likely to be involved in domestic conflict.  
Concerning traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, the findings range from positive 
(Menkhaus 2000) to skeptical views on its performance (Osaghae 2000). Few studies deal 
directly with the integration of traditional conflict resolution models into the state system. 
Zartman’s (2000) collection of “traditional cures for modern conflicts” among ethnic groups 
in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana, and Sudan evaluates the potential of traditional dispute resolution 
to resolve current conflicts. The authors come to different conclusions concerning its 
effectiveness, however.  
As with democracy, analyses of traditional institutions, peace, and dispute resolution 
differ in their conclusions as to the applicability and performance of such. Wig (2014) 
provides rare evidence for a positive relationship between traditional governance and 
domestic peace. Overall, the consequences of traditional-state dualism on peace and conflict 
seem underexplored.  
Consequences: Socio-economic Development 
Studies of traditional governance and socio-economic development primarily address the 
incorporation of traditional institutions into developmental policies. Various studies, e.g. ECA 
(2007a), Cheka (2008) on Cameroon or Friedman (2009) on Namibia, favor the inclusion of 
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traditional authorities in the development process. Empirical research on the compatibility of 
traditional norms, including patronage or kinship obligations, with market economies and 
development is rare, although some case evidence exists (e.g. OECD 2007).  
However, a number of studies emphasize effects of traditional political organization on 
economic development and state capacity. Englebert (2000, 2002a, 2002b) finds that greater 
heterogeneity among pre-colonial systems within a country decreases the developmental 
potential of present-day African economies. Furthermore, he suggests that the more state-like 
the pre-colonial political organization, “the greater the social challenge to contemporary 
statehood and the weaker the postcolonial state” (2002b, 166).  
In a quantitative empirical assessment of traditional governance in Sierra Leone, 
Acemoglu et al. (2014) measure how chiefs’ power influences economic outcomes. They find 
that more intense political competition in traditional polities (i.e., a larger number of 
potentially ruling families in a given location) has a positive effect on local levels of literacy, 
education, and child health. Their results indicate, “less constrained paramount chiefs retard 
the development of the modern economy within their chiefdoms, and harm the economic 
prosperity of individuals” (p. 28).  
For the case of Oaxaca state in Mexico, Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2014) find that in 
municipalities in which usos y costumbres – an indigenous form of participation – is applied, 
the levels of electricity, sewerage, and education are increased compared to other localities. 
Dionne (2012) shows how international and national measures to tackle HIV/Aids in Malawi 
depend on the actions of traditional community headmen: “no local development happens 
without the assent and participation of village headmen” (p. 2472). She finds that HIV/Aids is 
only a secondary priority for headmen. 
A wave of recent economic research uses the pre-colonial centralization of ethnic groups 
to explain contemporary regional development. Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) find a positive 
correlation between the extent of pre-colonial centralization in a country and an increased 
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level of service provision, e.g. in education, health, and infrastructure. Likewise, Osafo-
Kwaako and Robinson (2013: 9) present evidence linking pre-colonial centralization with 
better public service provision in Africa. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013, 2015) show 
a positive correlation between the hierarchical organization of an ethnic group and the level of 
regional development. Their findings suggest that the extent of pre-colonial centralization of 
African regions matters for today's patterns of economic development.  
The latter studies all focus on pre-colonial political organization, i.e., the statistical 
correlations do not capture the effects of contemporary traditional governance. The 
mechanisms of how pre-colonial structure should affect today’s development after such a long 
time remain unclear. While the explanatory approach of these studies provides valuable 
insights, relying on contemporary data seems desirable. At least, if pre-colonial data is used, 
we need causal theories to explain historical path dependence. 
A research agenda 
In the remainder, we discuss the research deficits and sketch how the lacunae can be filled. 
We start with the need for theory and continue with the need for comprehensive data and 
explanatory – qualitative or quantitative – empirical work.  
Need for Theory 
Conceptual work on traditional governance has largely focused on terminology and 
typologies. Typologies provide a first step in order to grasp variation of the phenomenon. 
Often, however, these classifications are neither distinct nor complete. Furthermore, 
categories have rarely been applied to a larger number of cases. 
What is rare in the literature is causal theory. Although many case studies lend themselves 
to abstraction (e.g. Beck 2001; Fanthorpe 2005), a further step toward deducing theories is 
rarely carried out. Moreover, conjectures about the effects of traditional governance are often 
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based on value judgments. This neglect of theoretical tools contributes to our lack of 
understanding of the dualism of traditional governance and the state.  
Noteworthy exceptions exist. Bates (1983) applies a political economy lens to the subject 
of community and state formation in rural Africa. Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal and van Dijk 
(1999, 24) examine the relationship of traditional and state authorities in political economy 
terms, as do Acemoglu et al. (2014) in their study of chiefs influence on development. Boone 
(1998) uses a theoretical framework of institutional choice to examine the diverse institutional 
topography of rural Africa. Most importantly, Baldwin (2013, 2014, 2015) and Koter (2013) 
analyze traditional leaders in view of chief’s incentives and democratic theory.  
As in these works, existing political science theories need to be applied to explain the 
contemporary significance of traditional governance and related political consequences. 
Traditional governance must be recognized for what it is: a variety of political system 
governing communities, which requires analysis in the same ways political scientists have 
approached state institutions. 
 A theory of traditional governance will inevitably vary depending on what is to be 
explained and on context. The consequences of co-existence and interaction of state and 
traditional authorities and thus causal links play out differently in our three domains:  
democracy, conflict, and development.  Furthermore, co-existence and interaction take place 
in different contexts on which causal paths are contingent. In particular, the significance of 
traditional communities, whether the state is a democracy or autocracy, more or less 
developed, or more or less ethnically diverse will all affect the causal processes.  
Yet, in our view rationalist institutional theories are a promising candidate for an 
overarching approach because they seem particularly relevant to the subject. The dual polity 
is problematic because of the potential incompatibility of two institutional systems in one 
territory. Institutional theories emphasize that explicit legal integration and institutional 
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harmonization are needed to reduce coordination costs and manage the dual polity. Economic 
institutionalism, for example, focuses on the complementarity of institutions as an important 
factor for the functioning of markets and for development (North 1990; Hall and Soskice 
2001). In this respect the interaction and potential incompatibility of the state-traditional 
dualism is not different from e.g. state-church relations, global legal pluralism (Berman 
2012), or federal and supra-national arrangements such as the EU.  
This reasoning leads to our first and basic hypothesis: 
 (H1) The less legal integration and harmonization of state and traditional institutions we 
observe in a country, the more negative consequences will appear.  
Legal integration or harmonization may take many forms, as the EU examples above 
indicate. We expect a country regulating and integrating traditional und state institutions in 
detail (e.g., developing a common judicial system) to face less adverse effects than a country 
with unregulated parallelism of two systems. However, we also expect a country trying to 
separate the diverse polities as much as possible (e.g. by granting territorial political 
autonomy or delineating competences) to face less adverse consequences than a country not 
regulating the co-existence. 
Second, we expect the effects of legal integration and harmonization to be contingent on 
the significance of traditional governance. Significance is a consequence of numbers, i.e., the 
share of population subject to traditional leaders in the overall population. If the share is lower 
than 2 percent (as in the US) we would not expect to observe any effects beyond the local 
level. In addition, political significance is a consequence of the powers the traditional leaders 
exert over their constituencies and within the state. If the traditional authorities are bereaved 
of most of their competences (as in Tanzania), we would not assume them to cause problems. 
We conceive of significance and legal integration as an interactive effect, although we phrase 
distinct hypotheses. 
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 (H2) The higher the significance of traditional governance in a country the more negative 
consequences might appear.  
What are the negative consequences? We concretize the consequences in terms of 
democracy, internal conflict and development. We demonstrate the relevance of 
incompatibility for each domain and propose exemplary hypotheses.  
As presented above, the compatibility of traditional governance with democracy was the 
subject of normative discussions but our empirical knowledge remains limited. We might 
expect that more democratic traditional polities have a better fit with democratic states and 
more autocratic traditional polities are more compatible with autocratic states, that is:  
 (H3) The more similar state and traditional authorities are in respect to their level of 
democraticness, the more compatible they are, thus reinforcing the level of democracy or 
autocracy in a country. 
We moreover hypothesize that traditional communities are more accepted, acknowledged, 
and integrated in democratic states because of the greater responsiveness of democracies to 
societal demands. That is,  
 (H4) The more democratic a state, the higher the level of legal integration of traditional 
governance.  
Regarding political conflict, the democratic fit of state and traditional authorities might 
also play a role. Incompatibility in terms of institutional features might be a source of political 
conflict. If a democratic state hosts sizeable autocratic traditional kingdoms tensions might 
occur, whereas–consensus-based traditional communities could be more prone to oppose an 
autocratic regime. Formal institutional integration could avoid the adverse consequences of 
dissimilarity in this respect. This reasoning leads us to two further hypotheses: 
 (H5) The more similar state and traditional authorities are in respect to their level of 
democraticness, the lower is the level of political conflict.  
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 (H6) The more legal integration and harmonization of state and traditional institutions 
we observe in a country, the lower is the level of political conflict. 
Turning to development, the provision of public goods in a dual polity requires some 
degree of cooperation. If two potential providers co-exist, either one of them may provide 
public goods separately. However, they can also be provided in a collaborative or in a 
competitive manner (cf. Clayton et al. 2015). Moreover, there is a risk that goods are not 
provided at all. We assume that the delineation of competences and the regulation of the 
modes of production serve to produce institutional fit and complementarity:  
(H7) The more regulated and integrated state and traditional public goods provision are, 
the more secure is public good supply.  
Specifically, legal uncertainty may play a role in case of land allocation. If a state-
organized land regime co-exists with a traditional one, the compatibility of both is vital to 
avoid uncertainty. Unambiguous property rights are a prerequisite for land development as 
uncertainty hampers investment. Thus:  
(H8) The less integrated state and traditional land rights are, the more property right 
uncertainty occurs and the less development we can expect.  
Figure 1 integrates these hypotheses in a causal model outlining the conditions for and the 
consequences of legal integration and institutional harmonization. We do not contend that this 
is a complete theory of the interaction of state and traditional polities. Further causal 
relationships can easily be envisaged and we regard the model as extendable. Moreover, we 
are aware that there might also be negative effects of legal integration, for example on 
democracy, as Chiweza (2007) and Hagmann (2007) have pointed out with respect to the 
accountability of traditional leaders. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
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Nevertheless, the diagram depicts how a rational institutionalist approach to state-
traditional interaction, based on the potential incompatibilities within a dual polity and legal 
integration as a remedy, provides a baseline for theory. This does not imply that other 
theoretical approaches, such as historical or sociological institutionalism, democratic theory, 
or political economy cannot contribute to the understanding of the causes and consequences 
of state-traditional dualism. Theories of institutional fit, however, relate closely to the very 
problems posed by dual polities. The specific hypotheses we suggest as examples may 
interact with other factors or may need qualifications contingent on context. Most 
importantly, they are hypotheses and as such they can be disconfirmed by empirical analysis. 
To test such hypotheses we are in need of data.  
Need for Comprehensive Data and Explanatory Research 
Despite the large number of empirical studies there is a lack of comprehensive data. Country- 
and ethnicity-based studies provide a quarry of evidence, but the data is often 
incommensurable. Although scholars focus on common research themes, the contexts and 
methods differ. Further, systematic datasets containing worldwide or longitudinal data on 
traditional governance simply do not exist.  
To be sure, we recognize the manifold important studies on ethnic politics and the many 
data sets on these and related issues.2 Yet, studying ethnicity is not equivalent to studying 
contemporary traditional governance. It is precisely our point that the academic literature 
lacks data on the current organizational principles within ethnic groups and on traditional 
polities’ interactions with states, and thereby neglects the political and social consequences of 
traditional governance today.  
To our knowledge, there are three sources of quantitative data that have been used for 
research on traditional governance: Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas, the Ethnic Power 
Relations (EPR) data set, and the Afrobarometer survey. The Ethnographic Atlas covers 1167 
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societies worldwide between 1962 and 1980 (Murdock 1967, 1981). The Atlas provides some 
information on traditional governance by, for example, classifying societies according to 
jurisdictional hierarchy (Murdock 1967, 52). The dataset draws on early ethnographic sources 
and has not been updated since 1972. The Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset codes 
politically relevant ethnic groups worldwide for the period from 1950 to 2005 
(Wucherpfennig et al. 2011). It contains data on the size of the groups and their political 
power status.  Although the dataset has no explicit information on traditional institutions, it 
can be useful in this context.  
The Afrobarometer’s survey collects data on contemporary traditional leaders in 19 
countries. While the first rounds of the survey questioned the respondents about their levels of 
trust in traditional leaders, the fourth (and the forthcoming sixth) round included a larger 
battery of questions on traditional leaders, e.g. on contact frequency, desired and perceived 
influence, and government affiliations of traditional leaders. However, the survey does not 
account for the diversity of traditional communities and their internal organization.  
The case study data focuses on a limited number of topics and remains geographically 
concentrated. According to our review, this body of scholarship concentrates mostly on Africa 
and covers only about half of that continent.  Whereas large parts of Africa are insufficiently 
studied, a few countries (in particular South Africa, Ghana, Namibia, Somaliland, or Uganda) 
attract most of the attention. Moreover, these studies focus merely on the governance 
structures within one country, and in most cases on only one traditional polity. With few 
exceptions, such as studies of Sierra Leone (Acemoglu et al.2014), Namibia (Hinz 2010), and 
Zambia (Baldwin 2014), no within-state comparisons of different traditional institutions exist.  
To be able to study the broader phenomenon of dual polities and legal pluralism, and to 
test hypotheses such as those outlined above, research on polity dualism and its consequences 
requires systematic, comparable, and reliable data on several dimensions:  
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• Data on the contemporary political significance of traditional governance for each 
ethnic group and country would be a basic prerequisite for an evaluation of its 
consequences on democracy, conflict, and development.   
• Data on the legal integration of traditional governance in states’ political systems, be 
it at the constitutional or ordinary law level, would allow to evaluate the effects of 
acknowledgement and harmonization on democracy, conflict and development 
(institutional fit).	  
• Data on the various types of contemporary traditional governance structures would be 
helpful to understand to which degree traditional governance is compatible with 
democracy. To assess the democraticness of traditional polities new measurements 
might be needed. 	  
• Data on public service provision and the performance of traditional institutions alone 
and in interaction with governments would allow for the estimation of their potential 
to complement states.	  
Such data would be most useful if collected on a worldwide scale and if it were longitudinal. 
To be sure, such a large body of data cannot be collected quickly by small-scale research 
projects. Only after systematic collection of such material, however, can coherent explanation 
follow.  
 The lack of theory and systematic data result in a lack of explanatory empirical 
research. Hypothesis-testing quantitative or experimental research is still rare – although 
rapidly growing in recent years. Attempts at generalizable knowledge are mostly very recent; 
of these, many still base their analysis on Murdock’s pre-colonial data. Most case studies – 
though valuable as exploratory hypothesis-generating endeavors – are not explanatory in the 
sense that they test hypotheses. Although theory-guided comparative and single case studies 
can serve to determine causality, given the current state of knowledge, a comprehensive 
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understanding of the political role of traditional governance necessitates greater scope. Only 
broadly based approaches will enable us to identify conditions and covariates of the various 
outcomes of polity dualism. Only comparative approaches will allow the concerned countries 
to learn from one another how to deal with the challenge of potential incompatibilities. 
Conclusion  
In this paper, we attempted to summarize and structure the existing knowledge on the dualism 
of traditional and state governance. We find that the description of the internal organization of 
traditional communities is scattered, somewhat dated, and lacks a comparative perspective. 
The literature on the co-existence and interaction of traditional governance with the state has 
produced a number of interesting approaches to describe and explain the strategic role of 
traditional leaders as intermediaries between politicians and population. The studies on the 
consequences of traditional governance and the contemporary dualism for democracy, peace 
and conflict, and socio-economic development are promising but do not allow for robust 
conclusions. Only very recently have studies been undertaken dealing with the contemporary 
developmental potential of pre-colonial organization, popular attitudes towards traditional 
leaders, and the conflict propensity of ethnic groups. Effects on other dimensions of societies 
and states, such as cohesiveness, social trust, accountability, or state capacity are yet to be 
observed. Nevertheless, the existing body of work provides a solid foundation for further 
research. 
In sum, valid inference about the dualism of traditional governance and the modern 
state is currently difficult to draw. Consequently, the academic knowledge of this significant 
phenomenon remains limited. We suggest a rational institutional framework in order to derive 
testable hypotheses. Only theory-guided explanatory research, based on systematically 
collected data, can provide us with reliable answers to questions as to the causes and effects 
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of the dualism of traditional and state governance, which we encounter in a great number of 
the world’s countries.  
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Endnotes  
                                                
1  We are conscious of how this goal necessarily limits the detail we can devote to each 
discussed contribution. We include only those studies that closely correspond to our 
framework. Inescapably, many works had to be left out, for reasons of space constraints, 
although they provide valuable contributions to the phenomenon. For further interest in 
traditional institutions see Geschiere (1993), Boone (1998), Evans (2014), Naseemullah 
and Staniland (2016) and van Cott (2010). 
 
2    To name but a few: the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF) 2014; Ethnologue, see 
Lewis, Simons, and Fennig 2014). Moreover, data sets on pre-colonial political 
organization exist (e.g. the State Antiquity Index, see Chanda and Putterman 2007). 
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Figure 1: Causal graph of institutional setups and political consequences 
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